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Abstract—Network diversity has been widely recognized as
an effective defense strategy to mitigate the spread of malware.
Optimally diversifying network resources can improve the
resilience of a network against malware propagation. This
work proposes a scalable method to compute such an optimal
deployment, in the context of upgrading a legacy Industrial
Control System with modern IT infrastructure. Our approach
can tolerate various constraints when searching for optimal
diversification, such as outdated products and strict configura-
tion policies. We explicitly measure the vulnerability similarity of
products based on the CVE/NVD, to estimate the infection rate
of malware between products. A Stuxnet-inspired case demon-
strates our optimal diversification in practice, particularly
when constrained by various requirements. We then measure
the improved resilience of the diversified network in terms
of a well-defined diversity metric and Mean-time-to-compromise
(MTTC), to verify the effectiveness of our approach. Finally,
we show the competitive scalability of our approach in finding
optimal solutions within a couple of seconds to minutes for
networks of large scales (up to 10,000 hosts) and high densities
(up to 240,000 edges).
Keywords-ICS/SCADA Security, Network Diversity, Optimal
Diversification, Malware Propagation
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are cyber-physical sys-
tems that are responsible for maintaining normal operation
of industrial plants such as water treatment, gas pipelines,
power plants and industrial manufacture. Modern industrial
organizations perform an increasing large amount of oper-
ations across IT and Operational technology (OT) infras-
tructures, resulting in inter-connected ICS. It also creates
new challenges for protecting such integrated industrial en-
vironments, and makes cyber-physical security threats even
more difficult to mitigate [1]. Therefore, many industrial
organizations started looking for methods to converge IT
and OT infrastructures in more secure and resilient ways.
In this paper, we consider software diversification as a
way of deploying products across ICS and improving the
resilience of the integrated systems. However, there are
various real-world constraints we might encounter when
finding an optimal diversification strategy, for instance,
limited flexibility of diversification for legacy systems, strict
configuration policies and other (un)desirable configuration
requirements. Therefore, our approach particularly considers
these constraints into optimization and evaluates the impact
of these constraints on the optimal diversification. Although
the proposed approach was demonstrated in the domain
of ICS, the approach can also be applied to find optimal
diversification plans for other systems in which there are
constraints on diversification of some system components.
Software mono-culture has been recognized as one of
the key factors that promote and accelerate the spread
of malware. It is widely acknowledged that diversifying
network resources (e.g. software packages, hardware, pro-
tocols, connectivity etc.) significantly mitigates the infec-
tion of malware between similar products and reduces the
likelihood of repeating application of single exploits [2].
When facing attacks using zero-day exploits (i.e. unknown
exploits), the situation becomes even worse as there are no
available defense countermeasures to stop them. Stuxnet, as
the first cyber weapon against ICS, leveraged four zero-
day vulnerabilities. Until September 2010, there were about
100,000 hosts over 155 countries infected by Stuxnet [3].
The invariability or high similarity of products used in most
affected hosts accounts for the rapid infection and prevalence
of Stuxnet. Therefore, diversity-inspired countermeasures
have been introduced to improve the resilience of a network
against malware propagation. However, it is not very clear
about (i) how much diversification is required to reach
an optimal/maximal resilience, (ii) how exactly to deploy
diverse resources across a network, and (iii) how config-
uration constraints would harm the optimal diversification.
This paper aims to mitigate stuxnet-like worm propagation
by optimally diversifying resources. We consider a variety
of off-the-shelf products to provide services at each host,
and find the optimal assignment of them to maximize the
network resilience.
There are two main trends of research investigating
diversity as an effective defense mechanism. One trend
seeks for solutions from software development such as
n-version programming [4], program obfuscation [5] and
code randomization [6]. The other trend studies diversity-
inspired defense strategies from the perspective of security
management. Specifically, the goal of this trend is to find
an optimal assignment of diverse products for each host in
a network.Detailed related work are provided in Section II.
Our work lies in the second trend of research. Most
of the existing work has made three critical assumptions:
(i) It was assumed in most existing work that there was
no configuration constraints when searching for an optimal
assignment of products; (ii) Currently only one vulnerable
product was modelled for each node in a network, which
is not realistic; (iii) Most existing work assumed that each
individual product shared no vulnerability with any other,
which implied that unique exploits are necessary to compro-
mise different products. We contend that these assumptions
in earlier work are unrealistic, and thus we drop these
assumptions in this work. We specifically defined config-
uration constraints into the process of optimization. Also
we considered a more realistic infection model of malware.
In the following subsection, a simple example demonstrates
how these assumptions prevent us from modelling the actual
infection model of malware.
In this paper, we start with formally defining the similarity
of vulnerabilities between products to reflect the similar
exploitability of products. We conduct a statistical study
to estimate such vulnerability similarities by using public
vulnerability databases such as Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE) [7] and the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) [8]. Furthermore, we represent each host
in a network by a multi-label node, which can be formally
mapped to a discrete Markov Random Field (MRF) model.
By combining the similarity metric and the MRF model, we
can construct the corresponding infection model of potential
zero-day exploits across a network with a given product
assignment. We then focus on computing an optimal product
assignment to minimize the prevalence of zero-day exploits.
Before we give our main contributions in Section I-B, we
present an illustrative example in Section I-A to further
explain the motivation.
A. Motivational Example
We use a simple example in Fig. 1 to explain the mo-
tivation of this work, where a simplified network with 8
hosts is presented. Most of the existing work models the
network as in Fig. 1(a), where each host is represented
by a single-label node. A zero-day exploit breaks into the
network from the entry node. In order to prevent the exploit
(which exploits circle labels) from infecting more hosts,
most existing work suggests to diversify all hosts in the
way indicated by triangle and circle labels respectively in
Fig. 1(a). The illustrated configuration is effective because
the spread of the exploit is stopped after it compromises the
entry node and hence the chance of the target node being
infected is 0.
Nevertheless, it is assumed that different products share
no vulnerabilities between each other, which is however
not always the case Therefore, we improve the model by
considering the vulnerability similarities between different
products. Fig. 1(b) demonstrates the zero-day propagation
when the two products (circle and triangle labels) have a 0.5
vulnerability similarity between each other, namely there is
a 50% chance that the same zero-day vulnerability exploited
at circle labels can also be exploited at triangle labels, and
vice versa. In this case, the probability of the target node
being breached is increased to approximately 0.125.
In most realistic scenarios, a host is supposed to de-
liver multiple services (e.g. operating systems, web servers,
email servers, databases, etc), each of which is potentially
vulnerable to zero-day attacks. That means each host ac-
tually offers several alternative attack vectors, and as a
result, sophisticated attackers can choose the vulnerability
with higher success rate to exploit the host. Therefore, we
represent each host by multiple labels corresponding to
different services on the host. As shown in Fig. 1(c), we add
another shape of labels (i.e. red squares) to some hosts, and
introduce a sophisticated attacker in possession of two zero-
day exploits (one for round labels and the other for square
labels). It can be seen from Fig. 1(c), the attacker uses the
square label exploit (rather than the round label exploit) to
infect its adjacent node, which gives a greater chance of
success. Consequently, with the collaboration of two zero-
day exploits, the risk of the target being compromised is
further increased to approximately 0.5.
B. Main Contributions
From the example above, we learn that in order to find
the optimal way to diversify network resources, we first
need to model the resources accurately, based on which
we can determine the optimal assignment of products to
minimize the prevalence of exploits. We summarize the main
contributions of this paper as follow:
(i) Our approach can be directly applicable in practice
to find the optimal diversification strategy when in-
tegrating ICS with modern IT infrastructure. We use
a real-world case study inspired by Stuxnet, to find
optimal diversification to IT-OT convergence of ICS,
particularly accommodating configuration constraints
and limited flexibility of diversification in legacy areas.
(ii) To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first at-
tempt to explicitly consider the vulnerability similarity
between products when finding the optimal diversifica-
tion solutions. Specifically, we represent each host by
a multi-labelling model with each label corresponding
to a product of the host.
(iii) In order to compute the optimal assignment of prod-
ucts, we model the network by a discrete Markov
Random Field (MRF), which then can be optimized by
an efficient sequential tree-reweighted message passing
(TRW-S) algorithm [9]. In this way, our approach can
scale up well to analyze large-scale networks.
II. RELATED WORK
Software diversity has long been recognized as a mech-
anism for improving resilience and security of networked
computing systems [2], [10], [11]. The rationale is that it
forces attackers to develop an unique exploit to compromise
an individual product at each node in a network, thus
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Figure 1: Motivational example about diversifying products in a network
substantially increasing the attacking time and cost needed
to penetrate a networked system at a massive scale.
A variety of methodologies for software diversity have
been studied in the literature, among which the first direc-
tion of research focuses on software development diversity.
Examples include n-version programming [4], execution
environment diversity [12] and code randomization [6].
The second direction, which is also the focus of this
paper, is the strategies for diversified deployment of re-
sources in a networked system. For instance, based on
the assumption that different variants of products share no
common vulnerabilities, O’Donnell and Sethu [13] proposed
to assign diverse software packages in a communication
network by a distributed coloring algorithm to limit the
total number of nodes an attacker can compromise using
a limited attack toolkit. Newell et al. [14] found an efficient
approach to compute the optimal solution for placing diverse
software/OS variants on routing nodes to improve overall
network resilience given the assumption that each variant is
compromised independently with some probability metrics.
Besides, there were some work defining formal security
metrics for software diversity. For example, Wang et al.
[15] defined a network security metric, k-zero day safety,
for measuring the risk of unknown vulnerabilities based on
the number of unknown vulnerabilities required for com-
promising network assets. Furthermore, Zhang et al. [16]
introduced three security metrics to evaluate the resilience
against zero-day attacks using different diversity strategies
based on the number and distribution of distinct resources
inside a network, the least attacking effort required for
compromising certain important resources, and the average
attacking effort required for compromising critical assets,
respectively. Borbor et al. [17] explicitly considered cost
constraints on optimizing software diversity strategies. It is
noticed that most existing work assumes that there is a very
limited attack surface provided at each host, namely there is
only one vulnerable product at each host. By contrast, we
explicitly model various attack vectors (offered by multiple
products) at each host.
Vulnerability databases such as CVE/NVD can provide
statistical evidence for measuring software diversity. For
example, Garcia et al. [18] presented a study on the overlap
of vulnerabilities in 11 different OSes with OS vulnerability
data from NVD. In [19], Bozorgi et al. trained classifiers
to predict whether and how soon a vulnerability is likely
to be exploited by applying machine learning techniques on
CVE data. On the validity issue of CVE/NVD, Johnson et
al. conducted the assessment of several well-known vulner-
ability databases and concluded that NVD was actually the
most trustworthy database [20]; we used NVD in this paper.
Some existing work [15] [16] [21] studied malware prop-
agation based on attack graphs to assess the risk of malware
along with specific attack paths and network topology. At-
tack graphs have been extensively studied in the community
to express the exploitation conditions of vulnerabilities.
However, due to the unknown nature of zero-day vulner-
abilities, we contend that such approaches are not always
feasible to model zero-day malware. In contrast to existing
work using attack graphs, our work focuses on the speed
of zero-day exploits across a network configured by similar
products. Highly similar configurations (in terms of potential
vulnerabilities) would accelerate the prevalence of zero-day
exploits. Instead of producing specific propagation paths,
we use more general undirected edges to symbolize the
connections (rather than directed information flow) between
different hosts. We then use the proposed similarity metric
to estimate the infection rate on each edge and find optimal
diversification solutions.
III. SIMILARITY OF PRODUCT VULNERABILITY
In this section, we formally introduce the notion of
vulnerability similarity between a pair of products, namely
the likelihood of an exploit compromising both products.
Definition 1 (Similarity of Product Vulnerability): Let
xi, xj be a pair of products, Vx1 and Vxj are sets of
vulnerabilities of xi and xj respectively. The vulnerability
similarity between xi and xj can be obtained by the Jaccard
similarity coefficient [22]: sim(xi, xj) =
|Vxi∩Vxj |
|Vxi∪Vxj |
Given a pair of products, the vulnerability similarity is
estimated by the ratio of the number of shared vulnerabilities
between the two products to the total number of vulnerabil-
ities. The rationale for this is to capture statistically how
similar the vulnerabilities found on two products are.
To provide a more realistic sense, we can use the data
from the NVD database [8] to calculate the similarity
metric for any pair of off-the-shelf products. An example
of an NVD entry is given in Table I, where the affected
products of a vulnerability are sorted by Common Platform
Enumerations (CPEs). CPE provides a well-formed naming
scheme for IT systems, platforms and packages.
Table I: Simplified NVD Summary for CVE-2016-7153
CVE-ID CVE-2016-7153
Vulnerable
software
&Versions
cpe:/a:microsoft:edge:-
cpe:/a:microsoft:internet_explorer:-
cpe:/a:google:chrome:-
cpe:/a:apple:safari
cpe:/a:mozilla:firefox
cpe:/a:opera:opera_browser:-
Given the large number of vulnerabilities in NVD, CPE
serves the role of sorting vulnerabilities according to their
affected products. We developed a program based on CVE-
SEARCH [23] to fetch necessary data from NVD, filter out
vulnerabilities for each studied product, and calculate the
similarity of vulnerabilities between products. The pairwise
similarities are stored as Similarity Tables. In this way, we
can calculate the similarity of vulnerabilities between any
pair of products listed in NVD. Note that the effectiveness of
the vulnerability similarity metric is subject to an assumption
that the metric that is based on past zero-day attacks is a
good predictor with respect to future zero-day attacks. We
believe that this is currently the best way available to predict
the future zero-day vulnerabilities.
For the purpose of illustration, here we use operating
systems and web browsers as examples. We collect vul-
nerabilities for 9 common OS products and 8 common
web browsers reported in the period between 1999 and
2016. Table II enumerates the pairwise similarity between
the chosen OS products and Table III for the chosen
web browsers. The reason for choosing these products is
mainly because they have been ranked as most vulnerable
products by CVE Details [24]. Each entry of the two
tables contains the pairwise similarity calculated by Def.(1)
and the number of shared vulnerabilities between products
in brackets. The diagonal entries in tables are the total
number of vulnerabilities of the row/column product. As
the pairwise similarity is symmetric, the other half of a
similarity table is omitted. For preserving the generality
and flexibility of our study, we implicitly consider each
different release/version of a product as a distinct product
to compare. For instance, Windows 8.1 and Windows 7 are
treated as two individual products and sorted by two differ-
ent CPE queries cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7 and
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_8.1.
Based on the statistical studies in both tables, we conclude
that a single vulnerability is likely to affect multiple products
across different versions, different vendors and different
platforms, which implies that a single zero-day vulnerability
could probably be exploited on heterogeneous hosts in a
network. Therefore, to maximize the resilience of a network
against zero-day exploits, it is desirable to use the up-
to-date products from diverse vendors across a network.
For instance, Windows 10 has much lower similarities of
vulnerabilities with the other Windows OS, and even shares
no vulnerability with Windows XP. However, it is not always
feasible to deploy the latest and diverse products due to their
incompatibilities with other services. For instance, SIMATIC
WinCC is one of the most widely applied SCADA systems,
but it can only operate on Windows OS, and most releases of
WinCC do not fully support Windows 10 yet [25]. It is one
of the key constraints addressed in our work when finding
optimal deployment for ICS.
In this section, we demonstrated the usage of CVE data to
calculate the vulnerability similarity. The NVD database is
one of the most well-known publicly accessible vulnerability
databases, which also covers most off-the-shelf products and
up-to-date vulnerability information. It is worth mentioning
that the versions of selected software in both tables are con-
strained by the granularity of CPE search engine. The CPE
entries for many vulnerabilities in NVD are not complete or
of different granularities.
IV. DIVERSE PRODUCT ASSIGNMENT
In this section, we present the formal model of a product
assignment for a given network, which is to find a diversifi-
cation solution to assigning products to each host such that
the malware propagation between similar products can be
effectively mitigated.
Each host has to provide a set of services S, such as an
operating system, a web browser and a database server. Each
service can be provided by a range of diverse products P .
Therefore, we formally define a network in terms of hosts,
links, services and products as below.
Definition 2 (Network): Let N = 〈H,L, S, P 〉 be a net-
work, H = {h0, . . . , hn} is a set of hosts. L captures the
links between a pair of hosts, L ⊆ H×H . S = {s1, . . . , sm}
is a set of services, and Shi ∈ 2S denotes a set of services
provided by a host hi. Shi = {s1, . . . , sk}, where Shi ∈
2S , k  m. P denotes a set of products, and hence each
service sj can be provided by a range of diverse products,
p(sj) = {p1sj , . . . , plsj}, where pxsj ∈ P.
Assigning one product for each service on a host is termed
as an assignment of products for a host.
Definition 3 (Product Assignment): Given a network
N = 〈H,L, S, P 〉, an assignment of products is captured
by α′ : H × S → P , such that α′(hi, sj) is the product
assignment for a service sj ∈ Shi at the host hi:
α′(hi, sj) = pxsj . The assignment for all services at a host
Table II: Similarity Table for Common OS Products from CVE/NVD
WinXP2 Win7 Win 8.1 Win10 Ubt14.04 Deb8.0 Mac10.5 Suse13.2 Fedora
WinXP2 1.00 (479)
Win7 0.278 (328) 1.00 (1028)
Win8.1 0.009 (10) 0.228 (298) 1.00 (572)
Win10 0 (0) 0.124 (164) 0.697 (421) 1.00 (453)
Ubt14.04 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1.00 (612)
Deb8.0 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.208(195) 1.00 (519)
Mac10.5 0 (0) 0.081 (109) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1.00(424)
Suse13.2 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.170(161) 0.112 (102) 0 (0) 1.00(492)
Fedora 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.083(75) 0.049 (41) 0.001(1) 0.116 (89) 1.00(367)
Table III: Similarity Table for Common Web Browser from CVE/NVD
IE8 IE10 Edge Chrome Firefox Safari SM Opera
IE8 1.0 (349)
IE10 0.386 (240) 1.0 (513)
Edge 0.014 (7) 0.121 (73) 1.0 (194)
Chrome 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.001 (2) 1.0 (1661)
Firefox 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.001 (2) 0.005 (15) 1.0 (1502)
Safari 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.002 (2) 0.009 (21) 0.003 (6) 1.0 (766)
SeaMonkey 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.001 (3) 0.450 (683) 0.001(1) 1.0(492)
Opera 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.003 (1) 0.003 (6) 0.004 (7) 0.004(4) 1.00(492) 1.00(225)
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Figure 2: A network with an assignment α by red circles
hi ∈ H can be derived by α : H × 2S → 2P :
α(hi, Shi) = (α
′(hi, s1), . . . α′(hi, sk))
= (pms1 , . . . , p
n
sk
)
where pms1 ∈ p(s1), . . . , pnsk ∈ p(sk)
Therefore α allocates products to all services running on
a host, whilst α′ assigns a product to a specific service of
a host. An example network is illustrated in Fig. 2, where
a network consisting of 6 hosts H = {h0, . . . h5} is mod-
elled. Each host provides up to two essential services web
browser and database. Three diverse web browser products
{wb1, wb2, wb3} and three database products {db1, db2, db3}
are available to choose. Each host might have different
ranges of products to choose. A possible product assignment
α is highlighted by red circles in Fig. 2
Now the problem is to find an optimal assignment which
allocates most diverse products for each pair of connected
hosts, so that the likelihood of a malware propagation
between two hosts can be minimized. Nevertheless, some
configuration requirements might hinder us from choosing
the most optimal product assignment in practice. Therefore,
we formally introduce local and global constraints to repre-
sent those requirements into the optimization process.
A local constraint indicates that for a particular host,
a product pj is required to either configure with another
product pl (expressed by cy), or avoid the product pk
(expressed by cx). Such requirements can also be applied
to all hosts by using global constraints.
Definition 4 (Configuration Constraints): Given a net-
work N = 〈H,L, S, P 〉, a set of constraints C expresses
any (un)desirable product combinations in the solution. A
constrained solution αC allocates products subject to C.
• a local constraint is applied to a specific host hi ∈
H in the form of: cx := 〈hi, sm, sn,+pj ,−pk〉 or
cy := 〈hi, sm, sn,+pj ,+pl〉 such that the constrained
solution αC satisfies:
∀cx ∈ C : α′C(hi, sm) = pj ∧ α′C(hi, sn) 	= pk
∀cy ∈ C : α′C(hi, sm) = pj ∧ α′C(hi, sn) = pl
• a global constraint is applied to all hosts in H in
the form of: cx := 〈ALL, sm, sn,+pj ,−pk〉 or cy :=
〈ALL, sm, sn,+pj ,+pl〉 such that αC satisfies:
∀cx ∈ C , ∀hi ∈ H : α′C(hi, sm) = pj ∧ α′C(hi, sn) 	= pk
∀cy ∈ C , ∀hi ∈ H : α′C(hi, sm) = pj ∧ α′C(hi, sn) = pl
The usage of constraints is demonstrated in the case study
(Section VII-B). We next define the optimal assignment of
products α̂ and the constrained optimal assignment α̂C .
Definition 5 (Optimal Diversification): Given a network
N = 〈H,L, S, P 〉, an optimal assignment of products is
captured by α̂ : H × 2S → 2P , such that α̂(hi, Shi)
is the optimal product assignment for a host hi ∈ H .
A constrained optimal solution is denoted by α̂C which
provides an optimal product assignment subject to a set of
local and global constraints C.
We adopt the following notation convention throughout
this paper. α denotes an assignment of products for a
network in general. α̂ is for an optimal assignment without
constraints, and α̂C is for a constrained optimal assignment.
Specifically, α(hi, Shi) includes the products assigned to a
host hi, and α′(hi, sm) is the product assigned to a particular
service sm at the host hi.
In the next section, we focus on finding such an optimal
assignment of products α̂ for a given network, as well as
computing constrained optimal solutions in Section V-A.
V. FINDING THE OPTIMAL DIVERSIFICATION
We need a model to represent a network in which each
host has multiple services and each service can be provided
by a range of products. Besides, this model has to offer
sufficient flexibility, allowing each host to run a customized
set of services and even the same service can have various
selections of products at different hosts. Furthermore, we
have to consider whether there is any existing efficient
optimization algorithm to such a model. For these purposes,
we choose to model the problem as a discrete Markov
Random Field (MRF), which is converted into an optimal
assignment problem of MRF that can be solved by an
efficient message passing algorithm.
Specifically, we model this problem as a discrete MRF
where each host has up to |S| services, and there are up
to |P | products for each service sk ∈ S. The optimization
assigns up to |S| products – one for each service on each
host – to reach the global minima of the propagation. Given
a network N = 〈H,L, S, P 〉, we derive the optimization
function E to denote the unary cost for each host and
pairwise cost between a pair of connected hosts.
E(N) =
∑
hi∈H
sk∈Shi
φ(hi, sk) +
∑
(hi,hj)∈L
ψ(α(hi, Shi), α(hj , Shj ))
(1)
where φ(·) denotes how likely a product is preferred by a
host hi to deliver the service sk, and ψ(·, ·) is a pairwise
cost between the products assigned to a pair of connected
hosts, which in our context would be the pairwise similarity
between products.
A. Unary Cost φ(·) with Constraints
The unary cost is derived from the preference of a
specific product for a host. By considering one product being
assigned to each host, our unary cost φ(·) is expressed as
∑
hi∈H
∑
sk∈Shi
Pr(α′(hi, sk)|hi) (2)
where Pr(·) presents the probability that a product is
assigned to hi. If there is no specific preference amongst
available products for each host to deliver a service, this
term can be replaced by a small constant Prconst for
optimization. However, we considered real-world networks
that are constrained by practical requirements. Therefore, the
unary cost is further refined subject to any constraints. For a
local constraint c ∈ C expressing an undesirable requirement
c := 〈hi, sm, sn,+pj ,−pk〉 or a desirable requirement
c := 〈hi, sm, sn,+pj ,+pk〉, our unary cost φ(·) can be
represented as follows:
Pr(α′(hi, sj)|hi)
=
{
Pc(α|α′(hi, sm) = pj , α′(hi, sn) = pk) if sj = sm
Prconst otherwise
For the constrained services (when sj = sm), the unary
cost is given by Pc(·) :
Pc(α|α′(hi, sm) = pj , α′(hi, sn) = pk)
∝
{
0 if c := 〈hi, sm, sn,+pj ,+pk〉
∞ if c := 〈hi, sm, sn,+pj ,−pk〉
where the desirable constraint contributes no additional cost
whilst the undesirable constraint introduces a large cost. The
optimization is then induced to reach desirable assignments,
but avoid undesirable ones. Note that such customized unary
cost can also be applied for any global constraint, which is
equivalent to applying a local constraint to all hosts.
B. Pairwise Cost ψ(·, ·)
The pairwise cost is derived from the similarity between
the assigned products. As mentioned previously, a pair of
connected hosts being assigned with more similar products
would have greater infection rate. When defining the pair-
wise cost, we penalize such similarities in order to provide a
more diverse product assignment for the network. To achieve
that, we define the pairwise cost term ψ(·, ·) as:∑
(hi,hj)∈L
∑
sk∈Shi∩Shj
sim(α′(hi, sk), α
′(hj , sk)) (3)
where hi and hj denote a pair of connected hosts, and
sim(·, ·) presents the similarity between two products pro-
viding the same service on a pair of connected hosts. It
serves as a strong regularization on the product assignment
as it ideally prevents the same product from being assigned
to connected hosts.
C. Optimization
Based on the unary cost and pairwise cost, we can
determine the optimal assignment α̂ for N by minimizing
the optimization function as below:
α̂ = argmin
α
E(N)
= argmin
α
∑
hi∈H
∑
sj∈Shi
Pr(α′(hi, sj)|hi)
+
∑
(hi,hj)∈L
∑
sk∈Shi∩Shj
sim(α′(hi, sk), α
′(hj , sk))
Solving such a problem is NP-Hard [9], and the alternative
way is to use an approximate minimization algorithm to
achieve a solution. The well-known techniques for solving
such problems are based on graph-cuts and belief propaga-
tion (BP). The former is currently considered as the most
accurate minimization approach for optimization functions
arising in many complex scenarios but it can be applied to a
limited range of optimization function forms. If the form is
outside the class, like our optimization function in Eq. 1, BP
is the common alternative. However, BP might not converge
when applying to a wide range of convex functions. Instead,
we employ a sequential tree-reweighted message passing
algorithm (TRW-S) [9]. Similar to BP, TRW-S can be applied
to the type of problems with the function form in Eq. 1. It
is also guaranteed to give an optimal MAP solution in most
cases [9]. TRW-S outperforms BP and graph-cuts on many
heavy tasks. It also demonstrates a great potential for the
cases of labeling of nearly flat probabilities, as well as the
cases of large-scale networks.
Our optimization scheme mainly follows [9], which is
also extended to a multi-level fashion to better fit our prob-
lem. Specifically, we enable the possibility of the parallel
computation and even GPU acceleration. In addition, the
optimization with constraints is also straightforward because
the constraints are efficiently encoded into the unary cost by
manipulating the cost for specific hosts and assignments.
More details about the scalability analysis are given in
Section VIII. A case study using our optimization approach
in practice can be found in the later Section VII.
VI. EVALUATION OF NETWORK DIVERSITY
This section evaluates how much diversity a specific
assignment can bring about into a network, and we achieve
this by using a network diversity metric based on BN [16].
Given a network N and a specific assignment α, we first
construct its corresponding BN to estimate the infection rate
on each edge between hosts, based on which we can evaluate
the network diversify by calculating the value of the metric.
We first need a way to capture the impact of the attacker’s
behaviour on malware propagation. From an attack entry
host, there are different ways to reach the final target by
continuously exploiting a number of stepping-stone hosts.
At each attack step from one host to another, there are often
more than one vulnerable products to exploit and induce
further spread of the malware. Therefore, we extended the
conventional attack paths by introducing a set of attack
nodes to capture which exact product is chosen to exploit
between a pair of connected hosts.
Attackers can choose one of the products to exploit or
keep silent. Different choices lead to different propagat-
ing rates to the destination host. Without considering the
similarity, the probability of a host being infected P ′hk=T
only depends on the products being chosen to exploit at the
host and the infection rate is set to the average zero-day
propagation rate Pavg .
In this paper, we adapt the diversity metric used in this
paper to evaluate product assignments for a network. The
network diversity metric was proposed by Zhang et. al. [16]
to evaluate a diversified network by measuring the average
attacking effort needed to compromise the network. We
adapt the metric to fit our model considering the vulner-
ability similarity of products.
Definition 6 (BN-based Diversity Metric dbn): Given a
BN B constructed for a diversified network N , and a specific
target host ht, the network diversity based on B can be
defined as below in term of the probability of the target host
being compromised: dbn =
P ′ht=T
Pht=T
where Pht=T (P
′
ht=T
) is
the probability of ht being infected with (without) consid-
ering the vulnerability similarity of products.
The probabilistic metric dbn estimates the average attack-
ing effort by combining all valid attack paths. Naturally, the
diversity metric dbn is always less than 1.0 and the greater
value indicates higher diversity. With the help of BN, Pht=T
captures the risk of the target host when the vulnerability
similarity of products is considered. Pht=T reflects the
current robustness of the network, which is provided by the
given assignment. P ′ht=T indicates the maximum potential
of the network diversity. More explanations are in [16].
VII. CASE STUDY - UPGRADING LEGACY ICS WITH
MODERN INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS
In this section, we present a case study on upgrading
legacy control systems with interconnected IT systems, to
achieve the convergence of IT and OT in modern industrial
networks. Such an integration can facilitate highly intercon-
nected Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) applications, but
also leave ICS more vulnerable by introducing more attack
vectors, i.e. as the control networks are no longer isolated,
malware can propagate itself across IT systems to breach
the core control units causing physical damage.
Therefore, in this case study, we demonstrate the usage of
our approach in finding an optimal diversification strategy to
improve the resilience of the integrated systems. Particularly
we consider three main constraints that might arise when
applying the approach in practice:
(i) Most hosts in OT networks run legacy software, which
have no flexibility to diversify or upgrade.
(ii) Some hosts in various networks are required to run
specific software and hence cannot be diversified.
(iii) Some desirable and undesirable product combinations
should be taken into account.
We start with a brief description of the case study in
Section VII-A. An optimal solution and two constrained op-
timal solutions are then computed and illustrated in Section
VII-B. In Section VII-C we evaluated the produced optimal
solutions in terms of (i) the diversity metric discussed in
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Figure 3: A typical structure of integrated modern ICS
Section VI, and (ii) the Mean-time-to-compromise (MTTC)
obtained from NetLogo simulations we have developed.
A. Experiment Configuration
The example is adapted from the Stuxnet-like worm
propagation analysis in [26]. There are newer ICS-targeted
attacks such as German steel mill [27] in 2014 and Ukrainian
power outage [28] in 2015, but Stuxnet is still the one with
the most detailed disclosure and hence used as a case study
here. Fig. 3 depicts a typical ICS architecture integrating ex-
isting OT zones (e.g. Operation Network, Control Network)
with new IT zones (e.g. Corporate Sub-Network, Clients
Network, Vendors Support Network). We use gray shading
to indicate that OT zones have no flexibility to diversify or
upgrade deployed software. Specific firewall white-list ac-
cess rules are given in Fig. 3 to provide perimeter protection
between different zones.
We use the example to demonstrate the Stuxnet worm
propagation across an ICS. The primary intrusion can be
introduced from the Corporate Network, Clients Network or
Vendors Support Network. Once a host has been exploited as
a foothold, the worm can continue scanning other connected
hosts for similar vulnerabilities, by which the worm can
propagate itself through the network. Stuxnet eventually
breached the hosts in Control Network, such as t4, t5 and
t6 in Fig. 3, which can access field devices.
In the following experiments, we consider the optimal
assignment of products to provide three key services, i.e. an
Operating System (OS), a Web Browser(WB) and a Database
Server(DB). These services are distributed across all the
hosts in the network according to the key role each host
plays (indicated in Fig. 3). For instance, the host c1 in
the Corporate Network is configured as a WinCC Web
Client, which runs WinCC V7.x as the main application. The
essential requirements for this application are a Windows OS
and an IE web browser [25], and hence a range of available
products that we can choose to install on c1 is provided
in Table IV. The host z2 in DMZ requires a Windows OS
and a Microsoft Database Server to run the WSUS server,
which is reflected accordingly in the table. As a result,
Table IV lists essential services required at each host and
the corresponding selections of products for each service.
We highlight the legacy hosts in grey in Table IV, which
run outdated software and cannot be diversified (e.g. the
host p2, p3 in the Operations Network). The example also
includes outdated versions of software running on legacy
hosts such as Windows XP, MS SQL 2008. All of these
introduce extra constraints in finding the optimal diversifi-
cation strategy. The other chosen products in Table IV are
either frequently suggested in WinCC manuals or rated as
one of the most vulnerable products by CVE Details [24].
The similarities of web browsers and operating systems
refer to Table II and III, and the similarities for DB are
obtained in the same way as described in Section III. Given
the products for each host in Table IV, we can compute the
optimal assignment to the networked ICS by the approach
discussed in Section V. It is worth noticing that our approach
offers high generality and flexibility, by which each host can
have a customized range of services, and each service can
have various ranges of products to deploy.
B. Optimal Assignment of Products
The optimal assignment α̂ for the case study is computed
by the approach introduced in Section V and illustrated in
Fig. 4(a). The assignment indicates the optimal strategy to
deploy the software in IT networks when integrating with OT
systems. The solution attempts to minimize the vulnerability
similarity between each pair of connected hosts. From the
Table IV: Available products for essential services in the case study
Serv. Products c1 c2 c3 c4 z1 z2 z3 z4 p1 p2 p3 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 e1 e2 e3 e4 r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 v1 v2 v3
s1
WIN XP       
WIN 7                    
Ubuntu 14.04                  
Debian 8.0              
s2
IE8         
IE10                
Chrome 50              
s3
MS SQL 08    
MS SQL 14        
MySQL 5.5       
MariaDB 10      
figure, we can find that each pair of connected hosts is
generally assigned with different products from each other.
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the second
type of constraints we might encounter is that some hosts
are required to run specific software according to certain
company policies. For this case study, we specify that the
host z4, e1, r1 and v1 are required to run specific products.
We outline fixed choices for these hosts in Table IV in
grey. Having adding those constraints into the optimisation,
we now compute the constrained optimal assignment α̂C1 ,
which is given in Fig. 4(b). It can be seen that whilst we fixed
the products of the four hosts, the new solution accordingly
updates assignments of products for several hosts to find a
new optimal diversification, as highlighted by red squares.
We can also specify undesirable product combinations to
avoid during optimisation. For instance, the solution α̂C1
in Fig. 4(b) uses the IE10 on Ubuntu14.04 at host v2. If
we want to eliminate such undesirable assignments, we can
specify and embed product constraints C2 in the computation
of optimal solutions, as introduced in Definition 4. Then we
can compute the constrained optimal solution α̂C2 that is
illustrated in Fig. 4(c). It can be found that the web browsers
at c2 and v2 are changed to Chrome as required.
The optimal solution α̂ is produced by minimizing the
optimization function presented in Section V-C, and hence
it guarantees the minimal infection rate of the worm and the
most diverse product assignment possible. In order to ac-
commodate the host and product constraints, the constrained
solutions α̂C1 and α̂C2 have to sacrifice a certain amount of
diversity. In the next section, we evaluate all these optimal
solutions and quantify the compromised diversity of the con-
strained solutions in terms of the diversity metric proposed
in Section VI and MTTC by our NetLogo simulation.
C. Case study analysis
1) Evaluation by Network Diversity Metric: We first
construct a BN for the case study with a given assignment
of products, to estimate the propagation of malware. In the
following experiments, we consider an attacker breaks into
the system from c4 in Corporate Network, and hence we
set c4 to be the root being infected with a prior probability
1.0. The final target of is set to the host t5 which has
the direct access to controlling the critical field devices.
Therefore, the probability of the target t5 being infected
becomes the key element to calculate the network diversity
metric dbn = P ′t5=T /Pt5=T , as defined in Definition 6.
Given an assignment of products (e.g. the optimal one
α̂), we can determine the possible infection rate of malware
at each edge with the help of the constructed BN. As we
investigate the infection of multiple zero-day exploits, we
assume that the attacker is in possession of three unique
zero-day exploits, each of which exploits a particular type
of product respectively (i.e. OS, WB and DB). Once a host is
infected, attackers search for similar products/vulnerabilities
to exploit amongst the connected hosts and proceed. When
multiple exploits are feasible, attackers evenly choose one to
use. The similarity between the source and chosen product
decides the likelihood of infecting the chosen product.
Table V: Diversity metric dbn of different assignments
Label Description logP ′t5=T logPt5=T dbn =
P ′t5=T
Pt5=T
αˆ optimal assign. -3.151 -3.062 0.81457
αˆC1 host constr. -3.151 -2.838 0.48590
αˆC2 product constr. -3.151 -2.833 0.48119
αr random assign. -3.151 -2.576 0.26622
αm mono assign. -3.151 -1.978 0.06709
The first row of Table V is the evaluation of the optimal
assignment α̂ which reaches a very high diversity dbn =
0.81457. The constrained optimal solutions αˆC1 and αˆC2
produce lower diversities as the two solutions are required
to accommodate certain constraints.
For the purpose of comparison, we also generate a ho-
mogeneous assignment αm which generally allocates the
same operating system, the same web browser and the
same database server for all non-constrained hosts. Such
mono-assignment provides the worst possible diversity for
the ICS case. It also shows how vulnerable the network
would become if we use homogeneous products. Besides, a
randomly diversified assignment αr is also provided, which
delivers a limited diversity that is significantly lower than
our optimal solution.
The notation P ′t5=T denotes the probability of the target
t5 being infected without considering the vulnerability sim-
ilarities between products. Therefore, P ′t5=T has a constant
value for all different assignments. When we take similarities
into consideration, the probability of t5 being infected P ′t5=T
increases with less diverse assignments of products.
(a) Optimal assignment of products (b) Optimal assignment of products 
with host constraints 
(c) Optimal assignment of products
with product constraints  
Win7
IE10
Ubt14
Chrome
Debian8
IE10
MySQL
Win7
IE10
MSSQL14
f1
Debian8 Win7
MSSQL14
Win7
IE10
Ubt14
Chrome
f2
c1
c2
c3
c4
z1 z2
z4z3
PLCs
p1
p3
p2
t1 t2t3
t5 t4t6
f3
Win7
IE10
MariaDB
e1
Win7
IE10
e2
Ubt14
Chrome
e3
Debian8
MSSQL14
e4
Win7
IE10
MariaDB
r1
Win7
IE10
r2
Ubt14
Chrome
r3
Ubt14
Chrome
r4
Debian8
MSSQL14
r5
Debian8
Chrome
v3
Win7
IE10
v1
Ubt14
IE10
v2
MariaDB
Win7
IE10
Debian
IE10
Ubt14
Chrome
MySQL
Win7
IE10
MSSQL14
f1
Ubt14 Win7
MSSQL14
Win7
IE10
Win7
Chrome
f2
c1
c2
c3
c4
z1 z2
z4z3
PLCs
p1
p3
p2
t1 t2t3
t5 t4t6
f3
Win7
IE8
MSSQL14
e1
Win7
IE10
e2
Ubt14
Chrome
e3
Debian8
MySQL
e4
Win7
IE8
MSSQL14
r1
Win7
IE10
r2
Ubt14
Chrome
r3
Ubt14
Chrome
r4
Debian8
MSSQL14
r5
Debian8
Chrome
v3
Win7
IE8
v1
Ubt14
IE10
v2
MSSQL14
Win7
IE10
Debian
ChromeUbt14
Chrome
MySQL
Win7
IE10
MSSQL14
f1
Ubt14 Win7
MSSQL14
Win7
IE8
Win7
Chrome
f2
c1
c2
c3
c4
z1 z2
z4z3
PLCs
p1
p3
p2
t1 t2t3
t5 t4t6
f3
Win7
IE8
MSSQL14
e1
Win7
IE8
e2
Ubt14
Chrome
e3
Debian8
MySQL
e4
Win7
IE8
MSSQL14
r1
Win7
IE8
r2
Ubt14
Chrome
r3
Ubt14
Chrome
r4
Debian8
MSSQL14
r5
Debian8
Chrome
v3
Win7
IE8
v1
Ubt14
Chrome
v2
MSSQL14
Figure 4: Optimal Assignment of products for the case study
2) Evaluation by NetLogo Simulation: NetLogo is an
agent-based modelling tool that enables a programmable
modelling environment for simulating behaviours of com-
plex systems [29]. We use NetLogo to construct the net-
worked ICS as shown in Fig. 3 and simulate the propagation
of malware. After breaking into the system from a host,
attackers can further spread the malware across the network.
Given an assignment of products (e.g. the one in Fig. 4(a)),
we can determine the possible infection rate of exploits at
each edge. By deploying the simulation with a given product
assignment, we can determine how much time is required by
attackers to penetrate the diversified network, which implies
the average effort required to compromise the network. More
optimal assignment should provide more resilience to the
network against the penetration.
To test the resilience provided by the diversification, we
designed five sets of experiment to simulate the malware
propagation from five different entry points respectively –
c1 and c4 from the Corporate Network, e3 from the Clients
Network, r4 from the Remote Clients, and v1 from the
Vendors Support Network. Once the entry host is infected,
attackers search for similar products/vulnerablities to exploit
from the connected hosts. We looked at the sophisticated at-
tackers who conduct reconnaissance activities before launch-
ing attacks, and hence at each step this type of attackers
always chooses the exploits with the highest success rate.
Table VI: MTTC (in ticks) against different assignments
Assignment MTTC
from c1
MTTC
from c4
MTTC
from e3
MTTC
from r4
MTTC
from v1
αˆ 45.313 37.561 52.663 52.491 24.053
αˆC1 28.041 16.812 44.359 48.472 15.243
αˆC2 14.549 15.817 45.118 46.257 14.749
αm 14.345 12.654 19.338 18.865 15.916
We deployed the network according to the three optimal
assignments αˆ, αˆC1 and αˆC2 respectively, as well as the
mono-assignment αm. Each experiment ran the simulation
for 1,000 times. The average MTTC for each test is given in
Table VI. The MTTC is the time steps (i.e. ticks in NetLogo)
consumed by attackers to successfully reaching the final
target. The results show that the optimal αˆ provides the
strongest resilience to the network, as it requires the longest
period of time to be compromised across all five scenarios,
while the other two constrained optimal assignments can
be compromised in a shorter period of time. The mono-
assignment provides the weakest resilience to the network.
VIII. SCALABILITY ANALYSIS
We run the optimization against a series of randomly gen-
erated networks to analyse the scalability of this approach.
Our optimizer is implemented using C++ and enables the
multi-threading mechanism to provide high convergence
speed in multi-level optimization. We apply a GPU-friendly
compute unified device architecture to gain extra efficiency
on complex matrix operation. All the experiments run on a
mid-range computer with an Intel i5 2.8GHz CPU, a 8GB
RAM and an Nvidia GTX 750. The optimization in all the
following experiments can be achieved within a reasonably
short time from a couple of seconds to minutes.
Table VII provides the computational time of optimizing
networks with the middle-scale (20 degrees and 15 services
per host) and high density (40 degrees and 25 services per
host). We observe that the number of hosts has a major
impact on the computational time, but our method still finds
the optimal solution within 3 minutes for large-scale (6000
hosts) high-density network. Moreover, we run experiments
on mid-scale and large-scale networks with various densities
and the results in Table VIII show that the degree has less
influence on the computational time than the number of
hosts. Finally, we vary the number of services for each host
on both mid-scale and large-scale networks in Table IX. For
a large-scale network of 6000 hosts with up to 240,000 edges
and 30 services per host, our method still performs well and
Table VII: Computational time (in seconds) for networks of various densities over different # hosts
# deg. # serv. # hosts
100 200 400 600 800 1000 2000 4000 6000
mid-density 20 15 0.239 0.438 1.099 1.478 1.944 2.784 6.706 16.517 33.392
high-density 40 25 0.640 1.766 3.553 5.881 8.135 10.999 27.484 82.500 151.110
Table VIII: Computational time (in seconds) for various sizes of networks over different # degrees
# hosts # serv. # degree
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
mid-scale 1000 15 0.759 1.577 1.954 2.693 3.294 4.040 4.652 5.174 5.758 6.309
large-scale 6000 25 21.239 40.940 59.216 77.583 95.750 117.810 144.470 152.040 167.190 189.710
Table IX: Computational time (in seconds) for various sizes of networks over different # services
# hosts # deg. # edges # services
5 10 15 20 25 30
mid-scale 1000 20 ∼ 20,000 0.603 1.608 2.709 4.008 5.253 6.974
large-scale 6000 40 ∼ 240,000 10.306 27.214 51.587 90.407 134.340 188.050
converges at about 3 minutes.
IX. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Moving towards integrated ICS enables an efficient way
to operate, but also provides new attack vectors. It is now a
challenging and urgent issue for many industrial organiza-
tions to find a secure way to converge OT and IT systems
to provide an efficient and also resilient industrial environ-
ment. Furthermore, there are other constraints hindering us
from finding an optimal solution, such as outdated legacy
systems, strict company policies and other configuration
requirements. In this paper, we proposed an approach based
on software diversification to increase the system resilience
of the integrated ICS against malware propagation.
We introduced the similarity metric to capture how similar
the vulnerabilities of two products are, which was then
applied in a statistical study on CVE/NVD databases. The
study showed that most vulnerabilities could affect multiple
products, even from different vendors. Therefore, when
finding the diverse assignment of products, we explicitly
considered such vulnerability similarities of products. The
similarity metric can estimate the likelihood of a zero-day
exploit successfully propagating itself between two products.
By assigning diverse products for a pair of connected hosts,
such propagation can be effectively reduced. Unlike most
existing work, we do not assume that there is only one
vulnerable product on each host, and instead we adopted a
multi-label model to represent various attack vectors on each
host, offered by different products. Such a model is of great
help to investigate the collaboration of multiple exploits.
We formally represented a network by a MRF model with
different services and products for each host. Such a model
can be efficiently optimized by the TRW-S algorithm. We
can then obtain an optimal assignment of products for the
given network. The optimal solution maximizes the defense
strength of the network against malware propagation. Com-
pared to random diversification, the optimal solution is more
effective in cutting off valid attack paths. In the scalability
analysis, we illustrated that our method scaled well in large-
scale high-density networks.
We contend that our approach has great value and po-
tential in practical applications, by which we can advise
on the best diversification strategy for a system operator to
decide the most robust way to upgrade an existing ICS. We
also demonstrated the practical usage of our optimization
approach in a realistic case study. Furthermore, we provided
a way to specify configuration constraints that we might
encounter in practice. Constrained optimal solutions can be
produced to accommodate these constraints.
There are several promising lines of research to carry
on. The vulnerability similarity of products in this work
is estimated by data from CVE/NVD. We are aware of
the potential “publication bias” of CVE/NVD. However, as
discussed in [20], NVD is currently the most trustworthy
database, compared to the others. Besides, a more systematic
way is needed to estimate the vulnerability similarity, such
as (i) from the perspective of software engineering [30]; or
(ii) by estimating how diverse two products are [31]. Another
future direction is to evaluate the diversified network from an
adversarial perspective, subject to different level of attacker’s
knowledge about the network configuration and vulnerabil-
ities that can be leveraged. In such a way, we can further
evaluate the results to prove that the proposed approach can
provide a more resilient network against zero-day exploits.
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